.svg){kind=small}
Grandchildren through the maternal line cannot claim coparcenary rights in a maternal grandfather’s property during the lifetime of their mother, especially where the mother has not herself claimed a share — the Bombay High Court has clarified the boundary between the 2005 amendment and the doctrine of obstructed heritage.
The 2005 amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 granted daughters coparcenary rights by birth, equal to those of sons. However, in Vishwambhar Namdev Nikam & Anr. v. Sunanda Maheshankar Surywanshi & Ors. (Civ. Revision Application 119/2025), the Bombay High Court clarified that these rights are not without limitations. The original suit was filed by a granddaughter seeking a share in her maternal grandfather’s ancestral property. Her claim was premised on the argument that since her mother was a coparcener by virtue of the 2005 amendment, she would also have a share in the same property.
Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, sons and — post the 2005 amendment — daughters have exclusive rights by birth to parental property. A Hindu male or female up to four generations of his or her lineage (son/daughter, grandson/granddaughter, and great-grandson/great-granddaughter) is termed a coparcener by birth. However, these rights do not extend to maternal descendants. Courts have consistently held that a coparcenary heir is one who has inherited from their father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court affirmed that only a coparcener by birth or adoption can claim or demand partition.
Coparcenary rights extend to four generations along the paternal line but do not apply to descendants through the maternal line. This distinction arises from the classification of inheritance. Unobstructed heritage (apratibandha daya) means that inheritance rights flow automatically upon birth regardless of whether the last owner is alive. This right extends only through the paternal lineage. Obstructed heritage (sapratibandha daya) implies inheritance rights obstructed by the existence of the last owner — rights are transferred through succession after the last owner’s death, not through survivorship. The granddaughter in the present case was claiming rights in her maternal grandfather’s property during the lifetime of her mother, who had not separately claimed a share. The Court held that such a claim cannot succeed.
This judgment has multiple legal implications. Grandchildren through the maternal lineage cannot claim property rights by birth or through survivorship; they may apply for succession only after the death of the last owner. The doctrinal clarity on obstructed and unobstructed heritage will help civil courts filter premature or baseless claims to ancestral property. While the judgment protects daughters’ rights post the 2005 amendment, it ensures those rights are not extended beyond the legislative intent, thereby preventing frivolous claims.
