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The Allahabad High Court has held that Internal Committees under POSH are quasi-judicial bodies whose findings carry binding effect — disciplinary action against IC members is permissible only where there is demonstrable misconduct, not merely an unfavourable outcome.
In Pratibha & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Writ-A No. 9112 of 2025, decided on 20 April 2026), the Allahabad High Court addressed a structurally significant question: whether IC members can be subjected to disciplinary scrutiny merely on account of the conclusions they reach. A POSH complaint was filed on 27 July 2025. An IC was constituted the next day and directed to submit its report within an extremely compressed timeline. Despite these constraints, the IC conducted proceedings, recorded statements, and submitted its report on 31 July 2025, concluding that allegations were not established. The State then suspended both the accused officer and the IC members themselves, alleging the IC had deliberately attempted to exonerate the accused.
The Court undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Sections 11, 13, 18, and 26 of the POSH Act read with Rules 7 and 9 of the POSH Rules. It observed that the statutory design does not contemplate a parallel or subsequent inquiry by the employer once the IC has completed its proceedings. Emphasising that Section 18 provides an appellate remedy only against IC recommendations and Section 26 imposes penalties on employers for non-compliance, the Court held that IC recommendations are mandatory and operative in nature — not merely consultative. An employer has no scope to conduct a de novo evaluation of the IC’s findings.
The Court characterised the IC as a quasi-judicial authority on the basis that it exercises powers akin to a civil court under Section 11(3), including summoning witnesses, examining evidence, and adjudicating between parties. This classification carries significant consequences: IC members must act independently, base conclusions on evidence, and adhere to natural justice. Their decisions cannot be lightly interfered with, nor can they be penalised merely because their conclusions are unpalatable to the employer.
Drawing on Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India (1999) 7 SCC 409, the Court held that disciplinary proceedings against quasi-judicial functionaries are permissible only where there is evidence of lack of integrity, recklessness, or mala fide exercise of power — not mere errors of judgment. The suspension orders were quashed as they failed to record any prima facie satisfaction of misconduct and were issued under unrealistic administrative pressure. Fresh proceedings were permitted, subject to compliance with the law.
